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Abstract 
Coordination among actors in a humanitarian relief supply chain decides whether a relief operation 
can be or successful or not. In humanitarian supply chains, due to the urgency and importance of 
the situation combined with scarce resources, actors have to coordinate and trust each other in 
order to achieve joint goals. This paper investigated empirically the role of swift trust as mediating 
variable for achieving supply chain coordination. Based on commitment-trust theory we explore 
enablers of swift-trust and how swift trust translates into coordination through commitment. Based 
on a path analytic model we test data from the National Disaster Management Authority of India. 
Our study is the first testing commitment-trust theory (CTT) in the humanitarian context, 
highlighting the importance of swift trust and commitment for much thought after coordination. 
Furthermore, the study shows that information sharing and behavioral uncertainty reduction act as 
enablers for swift trust. The study findings offer practical guidance and suggest that swift trust is 
a missing link for the success of humanitarian supply chains.  
2 
 
Keywords: Humanitarian Supply Chains; Swift Trust; Coordination; Trust-Committment Theory; 
Covariance-Based SEM. 
 
1. Introduction 
Disasters displace people, disrupt lives and cause human and economic losses. Per a recent study 
by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization between 2003 and 2013 natural disasters 
caused a total of $1.5 trillion in damages worldwide, having led to more than 1.1 million deaths 
and having affected the lives of more than two billion people (FAO, 2015). An effective response 
to a disaster necessitates a supply chain approach where relief items are sourced, procured, moved, 
stored and delivered in ways that minimizes human suffering (Van Wassenhove, 2006; Gajendran 
and Oloruntoba, 2017). In this paper, we refer with humanitarian relief supply chains to the 
operations of humanitarian actors (e.g. local and international non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), Red Cross, local government, invited military forces etc.) responding to a large scale 
humanitarian event with the purpose of delivering food, water and non-food items like shelter to 
the affected communities (Banomyong et al. 2016; Burkart et al. 2016). In this paper, large scale 
humanitarian events refer to natural or man-made disasters that exceed the response capacity and 
capabilities of local jurisdictions. 
In general, it can be argued that humanitarian relief supply chains (HRSCs) share the same 
guiding principles with commercial supply chains like moving the right goods and services, to the 
right place, at the right time, and the right cost, but unlike commercial supply chains, HRSCs 
operate under highly dynamic and politically charged conditions (Ulku et al. 2015; Jabbour et al. 
2017). For example, with the European Union negotiating a deal with Turkey to stop the flow of 
refugees into the EU, UNHCR had to alter their whole supply chain in Greece designed to serve 
populations on the move, to a supply chain designed to serve dispersed but static groups of people, 
like supplying refugee camps (The New York Times, 2016 ) . An additional challenge for HRSCs 
is information. Immediately after a disaster, information on survivor needs, accessibility of roads 
and alternative routes can be unavailable, incomplete or unreliable (Swanson and Smith, 2013). 
But most importantly, HRSCs have a different objective function, which is to minimize deprivation 
cost defined as “the suffering brought about by the lack of goods and services” (Holguin-Veras et 
al., 2012, p. 498).  
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While the direct impact of natural disasters on human life and property could be reduced 
by proper investment in mitigation and preparedness, the effectiveness of post-disaster relief to 
survivors can be undermined by poor management (Ozdamar et al. 2004; Altay, 2008; Coles et al. 
2017; de Camargo et al.). Suffering of the affected population may be prolonged due to lack of 
coordination among humanitarian actors responding to the event (Jin et al. 2015). A poorly 
managed, uncoordinated response will result in duplication of efforts, waste of resources and slow 
and inequitable distribution of aid. As no single organization has sufficient resources to respond 
effectively to a major disaster, a quick, organized response requires a coordinated effort (Balcik et 
al., 2010; Moshtari, 2016). The sheer number and diversity of humanitarian actors converging at 
a disaster site at the same time makes coordination difficult. For example, over 40 governments 
and more than 700 NGOs provided humanitarian assistance following the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
in late 2004/early 2005 (Chia, 2007). The United Nations Office of Coordination for Humanitarian 
Assistance (OCHA) recognized the inadequate initial international response to the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami and initiated the Humanitarian Response Review process in 2005. The review team 
identified poor coordination among humanitarian actors as one of the key problems in 
humanitarian assistance. In response, OCHA established the cluster approach as UN’s 
coordination mechanism (Jahre and Jensen, 2010). 
Coordination can only happen if the organizations involved are committed to it. Kabra and 
Ramesh (2015) listed commitment as one of the key drivers of coordination. Within the 
commercial context commitment and coordination have been found to positively influence each 
other (Hoegl et al., 2004). Furthermore, following the notion of trust-commitment theory (Morgan 
and Hunt, 1994) – which is the key guiding theoretical framework for our investigation – trust is 
the key antecedent for commitment to emerge. We therefore suggest with our work that trust and 
commitment as enabling variables need to be studied in HRSCs context. The relationships of trust 
and commitment have not been empirically explored within the humanitarian context, though 
Tatham and Kovacs (2010) argued that HRSCs are often hastily formed due to the unpredictable 
nature of the events and the actors must quickly form trust between them. This so-called swift is 
therefore one of the centrepieces of our investigation.  
Kunz and Reiner (2012) have conducted a meta-analysis of humanitarian literature and 
noted that case research and survey based studies are scant. The existing humanitarian relief supply 
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chain literature lacks empirical studies focused on theory building to better understand the 
dynamics of HRSCs. Hence, our research is motivated by this fact. In short, we argue that there is 
a need for theory-based empirical research on coordination of humanitarian relief supply chains. 
Hence, extending further the work of Morgan and Hunt (1994) to the HRSCs domain we draw 
upon another antecedents for trust from their work to test and inform also practice how swift trust 
can be built. Morgan and Hunt list communication and absence of opportunistic behavior as major 
antecedents that trust can emerge. Information sharing refers to the creation and dissemination of 
situational information by humanitarian organizations (Constantinides, 2013). Altay and Labonte 
(2014) explored impediments to information flow among humanitarian actors based on lessons 
learned reports for Haiti response. Altay and Pal (2014) showed via simulation how having the 
cluster lead organization act as a centralized processor of information in combination with cluster 
participants’ willingness to share information improves diffusion of relevant information to all 
cluster participant organizations and facilitate a coordinated response. What has not been 
considered yet in the humanitarian relief supply chain management literature is the relationship 
between swift trust and information sharing. One of the objectives of this paper is to explore this 
link. Hence, in this paper we focus on swift-trust and coordination among the actors in HRSCs and 
address the first question: what are the distinct and joint effects of information sharing and 
behavioral certainty on swift-trust?  
 Boyd et al. (2012) argues that direct effects are crucial, but they seem incapable of 
explaining the complexity of the reality. Hence, based on previous scholars arguments (see, Sousa 
and Voss, 2008; Eckstein et al. 2015), the performance effects of certain supply chains hinge on 
the mediating effect of the environmental context. The empirical research on supply chain 
coordination has however, largely neglected the impact of relational constructs like swift-trust. In 
this regard we specify our second research question as follows: what is the effect of swift-trust on 
the coordination among actors in HRSCs? 
By empirically validating a theoretically derived framework, this study offers three major 
contributions to the HRSCs literature. First, we investigate the relationships between information 
sharing, swift trust and commitment and their connection to coordination within the HRSCs 
context. Out of these four constructs, commitment along with their connection to coordination 
have not been explored within the HSRCs literature. Second, the relationship between swift trust 
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and information sharing has not been clarified. For example, Altay and Pal (2014) have modeled 
trust as an antecedent to information sharing and did not find statistically significant support 
through their simulation experiments. This paper, on the other hand models information sharing 
as an antecedent to trust (specifically, swift-trust) and supports it with empirical evidence. And 
third, we enrich the HRSCs literature by conducting a theory focused empirical study.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section deals with underlying theory and the theoretical 
framework. We follow with an outline of our research methodology. Next, data is analyzed, 
followed by a discussion of results, theoretical contributions and managerial implications. In the 
final section we conclude the paper and discuss limitations and further research directions.  
2. Theoretical Framework and Research Hypotheses  
Humanitarian relief supply chain management is a young discipline. Tabaklar et al. (2015) argue 
that to advance the HRSC literature theories from other disciplines need to be borrowed. We have 
looked at a wide range of literature from across disciplines to extract the constructs in the 
conceptual framework shown in Figure 1. Our theoretical framework commitment-trust theory 
(CTT) and swift trust (ST).  
Though initially developed for the context of relationship marketing, CTT has been adopted for 
the investigation of international relations of firms (Friman et al. 2002), the not-for profit sector 
(MacMillan et al. 2005), IT outsourcing (Goo and Huang, 2008), knowledge sharing (Hashim and 
Tan, 2015), supply chain management (Kwon and Suh, 2005) or purchasing (Gao et al. 2005). The 
central tenet of CTT is that it is now power, but trust and commitment that decide upon the 
successfulness of relationships (Morgan and Hunt, 1994).  
For example, Akhtar et al. (2012) suggested that tangible (finance, technology, and people) and 
intangible (leadership, extra efforts, relevant experiences, education, relationship management 
skills, research abilities, and performance measurement skills) organizational factors play an 
enabling role in coordination. Similarly, Kabra and Ramesh (2015) identified drivers of 
coordination in HRSCs as strategic relations between actors, commitment from the actors, use of 
information technology, regular meetings between actors, building a trustworthy environment, 
mutual learning, cultural cohesion and cooperation among actors, training, transparency, 
performance evaluation systems, and feedback mechanisms. Balcik et al. (2010) on the other hand, 
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turned their attention to barriers to coordination and listed the number and diversity of actors, 
donor expectations and funding structure, competition for funding, impact of media, 
unpredictability, resource scarcity/oversupply, and the cost of coordination as potential inhibitors.  
Swift trust is a form of trust occurring in temporary teams (Meyerson et al., 1996), particularly 
when there is time pressure or achieving project goals is of great importance (Mishra, 1996). 
HRSCs engage host governments, the military, local and international relief organisations, and 
private sector companies, each of which may have different interests, mandates, capacities and 
logistics expertise (Balcik et al., 2010). These humanitarian actors converging to the same location 
at the same time to coordinate a relief operation demands rapid building of trust (Tatham and 
Kovacs, 2010). Trust is an important factor for the success of supply chain relationships 
(Laaksonen et al., 2009; Barratt, 2004; Fawcett et al., 2008; Capaldo and Giannoccaro, 2015; 
Moshtari, 2016). Lu et al. (2016a) argued that trust in the marketplace enhances the intention to 
engage with the market place. Lu et al. (2016b) further argued that trust is a central aspect in many 
economic transactions that can involve social uncertainty and risk. Tatham and Kovacs (2010) 
pointed out that such trust is developed over a period of time, but actors in HRSCs usually do not 
have this time available. Hence, in case of hastily formed networks, trust or swift-trust may not 
have the same positive influence as it has in commercial supply chains.  
This paper explores the relationships between information sharing, swift trust, commitment, and 
the relationship between commitment and coordination. Below we derive these linkages. To the 
best of our knowledge this model has not been tested in the humanitarian context before.  
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Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
 
2.1 Information Sharing and Swift Trust among Actors 
Information sharing among actors creates transparency, i.e. humanitarian actors sharing 
information about their available capabilities and resources helps everyone understand their role 
in a coordinated response. One example is the 3W (who does what where) databases OCHA creates 
and publishes after a disaster. And there is evidence in leadership literature that transparency 
improves trust (Norman et al., 2010). Furthermore, Hung et al. (2004) mention availability of 
information about third-parties as a factor in establishing trust. Therefore, we infer that information 
sharing can improve trust.  
Meyerson et al. (1996) have made a case for the need for swift trust among members in a 
temporary group. Swift trust is defined as the willingness to rely upon team members to perform 
their formal and informal roles in a hastily formed temporary team (Zolin, 2002). Especially 
important is the direction of relationship between information sharing and swift trust. Altay and 
Pal (2014) proposed that trust improves information sharing but did not find statistical evidence in 
support of their proposal. One reason for this may be the fact that they did not test swift trust. Trust 
in their study took time to build.  
The theoretical reasoning according to CTT is that relevant, timely and reliable information 
will create trust. If this kind of information is provided it is easier to identify and solve conflicts in 
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a timely manner as well as to adapt to each other and adjust expectations to the other actor (Morgan 
and Hunt 1994).  
In this study, we posit that information sharing improves building swift trust (not the other 
way around as Altay and Pal (2014) suggested) among actors of a humanitarian relief supply chain.  
Thus, we hypothesize: 
H1: Information sharing among humanitarian actors increases swift trust. 
2.2 Information Sharing and Behavioral Uncertainty Reduction 
Behavioral uncertainty is defined as the inability to predict one’s collaboration partners (adapted 
from Joshi and Stump, 1999). In our case partners refer to humanitarian organizations. Willamson 
(1985) argued that behavioral uncertainty happens due to lack of complete information about one’s 
partners in a network. Thus, information sharing between partners could reduce behavioral 
uncertainty. 
H2: Information sharing among humanitarian actors will reduce behavioral uncertainty. 
2.3 Behavioral Uncertainty Reduction and Swift Trust 
Van Der Horst and De Langen (2008) suggest that reduction in behavioral uncertainty could lead 
to better coordination. Although, the nature of the connection between reduction in behavioral 
uncertainty and coordination has not been well explained, the link between trust and behavioral 
uncertainty associated with a partner has been shown in supply chain literature (Dyer and Chu, 
2003). It is reasonable to assume that the faster an organization knows who their collaboration 
partners are, the quicker they can build trust. Thus, behavioral uncertainty among partners should 
lead to improved swift trust.  
H3: Behavioral certainty will improve swift trust. 
2.4 Swift Trust and Commitment 
Commitment is defined as the intention to continue a course of action or activity (Hocutt, 1998). 
Most humanitarian organizations understand that a more collaborative environment will help them 
utilize their resources more effectively in delivering relief to the affected population. Conway and 
Swift (2000) have identified trust and commitment as the two most important factors for building 
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coordination among actors. Wilson (1995) further supported this argument by identifying trust as 
an important building block in a relationship. Mietilla and Moller (1990) have argued that trust is 
the precondition for enhancing commitment. Morgan and Hunt (1994) also proposed that trust 
improves commitment, laying the foundation of CTT.  
 The underlying theoretical argument why trust nurtures commitment is that trust is a unique 
asset in real life that is scarce. Following Hrebiniak (1974), these relationships attracts actor 
investment as trust based relationships are highly valued. For example, in case of high trust actors 
won’t over-monitor their counterparts and provide sufficient freedom for their operations. If a 
partners feels trusted he might pay more attention and value to the relationship, than he might do 
for a purely transactional relationship. Following the tenant of CTT we postulate also for the case 
that commitment almost follows automatically the emergence of trust.  
We extend this argument into HRSCs and hypothesise that:  
H4: Swift trust positively influences commitment of humanitarian actors. 
 
2.5 Commitment and Coordination  
Coordination in HRSCs is one of the subjects of debate in recent years (see, Balcik et al., 2010; 
Jahre and Jensen, 2010; Akhtar et al., 2012; Altay and Pal, 2014). Balcik et al. (2010) attempted 
to offer operational definition of coordination among various actors engaged in disaster relief 
work. Per Balcik et al. (2010, p. 23), “coordination is defined as a degree of interactions among 
actors in humanitarian supply chain network operation within the relief environment”. Based on 
CTT, we suggest that actors, once committed to a relationship, would not easily opt for starting 
other relationship opportunistically. This allows partners in a relationship to establish joint routines 
and ways of working. Even though the time horizon of a relationship might still rather be short in 
HRSCs setting, actors might find it far easier to work together if they not that the other actor is 
prudent as they themselves are reciprocally committed to the relationship. This is particularly 
likely in the case of scarce resources and high time pressure like in the case of HRSCs as 
coordination might improve the outcome of the crisis significantly. Also, following the 
argumentation of Morgan and Hunt (1994) it is important to note that both trust and commitment 
have to be in place in order to facilitate collaborative practices such as coordination. 
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H5: Commitment among humanitarian actors has a positive impact on coordination.  
3. Research Design 
3.1 Construct Operationalization 
To test our conceptual framework a survey instrument (see Table 1) was developed by identifying 
the appropriate measurements from literature. The constructs were measured on a five-point Likert 
scale with anchors ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5) in order to ensure high 
statistical variability among survey responses. We modified the nomenclature in the existing scales 
to make them more suitable to the context of HRSCs, since most of the measurement scales were 
developed for commercial supply chains. A panel of disaster management experts from the state 
government, military, and NGO’s in India checked the survey for face and content validity. This 
review of the survey instrument also made sure that it does not contain irrelevant items and there 
are no ambiguities in wording. Table 1 presents the constructs used and the literature they were 
adapted from. 
Additionally, we included control variables in our analysis. Heaslip et al. (2012) noted that cultural 
differences between civil and military may influence coordination between actors involved in 
disaster relief operations. Separately, Kovacs and Spens (2009) argued that the size of the 
organizations involved in disaster relief operations may influence coordination between them. 
Hence, to eliminate undesirable sources of variance, we controlled for organization type and size. 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
3.2 Data Collection 
The survey was administered to officers and managers in various organizations that are involved 
in disaster relief activities in India. Thus, admittedly the humanitarian relief supply chains 
considered in this study are limited to the context of India. However, India is a developing nation 
frequently exposed to natural disasters. Consequently, local and international NGOs and foreign 
militaries have been collaborating and continue to work together in delivering help to vulnerable 
populations. Therefore, due to the size, organizational diversity and exposure to a variety of 
disasters we believe that HRSCs in India provide an appropriate test bed to explore the dynamics 
of coordination among humanitarian partners.   
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In India, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) is an agency under the Ministry 
of Home Affairs (MHA) that was created through the Disaster Management Act in 2005 to 
coordinate response to natural or man-made disasters and build capacity in disaster relief 
organizations in order to improve the national response to disasters. The NDMA is equivalent to 
FEMA in the USA. The National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM) operates under 
NDMA and publishes a directory of organizations and resource persons involved in disaster 
management in India. Through this directory, we reached out to India’s Ministry of Defense, 
Ministry of Railway (in India the Ministry of Railway has a disaster response team), Ministry of 
Health and Family Affairs, as well as to the Directors General of Police for the states of 
Uttarakhand, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu. We also contacted various NGOs that 
worked with these ministries on relief supply chains. We requested each of these organizations to 
distribute our questionnaire to their top managers and to those senior team members who had been 
involved in disaster relief activities. 
This method of survey distribution is suitable considering India’s unique social and cultural 
context because in India, collecting data from government-based organizations requires personal 
contacts. The use of authority figures as brokers/agents of survey distribution has its positives and 
negatives: its advantage is that high return rates can be expected. The disadvantage is that the 
degree of geographical diversity and reach is limited to the availability of contacts in key positions.  
The four states mentioned above were selected merely because we could identify personal contacts 
in the organizations in these states to help us distribute the survey.   
Data was collected in two separate attempts. The first attempt happened between March and 
September 2015. A total of 157 questionnaires were distributed and 122 questionnaires were 
returned, with 117 complete and useable for data analysis (response rate 74.52%). Following 
Dillman’s (2011) Total Design Method, initial mailings were followed by second mailings and 
follow-up phone calls if necessary. Unfortunately, the results of our analysis of this data only 
showed weak to moderate strength for the linkages in our theoretical framework. More 
importantly, we recognized that our survey was not capturing coordination properly (the questions 
in the original survey captured effectiveness of response but not necessarily coordination among 
humanitarian actors). Consequently, a new scale for coordination was developed based on Basnet 
(2013) (see Table 1). Since we asked our respondents to provide names and contact information 
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on our surveys, the 117 respondents to the original survey were contacted back and requested to 
answer the new questions on coordination. To further strengthen statistical power, an additional 
300 questionnaires were sent out to NIDM members. This second attempt resulted in 70 complete 
surveys (response rate 23.33%). Thus, in total we received 187 usable responses out 457 
questionnaires sent. This shows an effective response rate of 41 percent which is very high for 
supply chain management research and humanitarian supply chain research in particular. Profiles 
of the respondents are provided in Table 2. 
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
3.3 Nonresponse Bias Test 
Armstrong and Overton (1977) argued that with survey data there is a possibility that the opinion 
of respondents may differ from the opinion of the recipients who did not respond to the survey. 
This introduces a bias to the results. In our case we split the collected data into two equal halves 
as suggested by Chen and Paulraj (2004) depending on the dates they were received. We assessed 
nonresponse bias using t-tests and found no significant differences between the two sets of data 
(p>0.05) indicating that non-response bias is unlikely, specifically as our response rate is very high 
too. 
4. Data Analyses and Results 
We first checked for constant variance, existence of outliers, and normality (Chen and Paulraj, 
2004; Dubey and Gunasekaran, 2015). We also used plots of residuals by predicted values, rankits 
plot of residuals, and statistics of skewness and kurtosis (Cohen et al., 2003). We found that the 
indicators for skewness and kurtosis are much lower than the specified limits in past research 
(Curran et al., 1996; Kim and Malhotra, 2005; Dubey and Gunasekaran, 2015). Hence, we did not 
observe any significant deviations from the normality assumption. Additionally, to ensure that our 
data was free from multicollinearity, we calculated variance inflation factors (VIF). All the VIFs 
were less than the recommended threshold of 10.0, (Hair et al., 2006) suggesting that 
multicollinearity is not an issue in our data. 
Our data comes from governmental and non-governmental organizations which differ largely in 
terms of size, culture, policies, structure, operating styles and role in response operations. We 
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checked if the data from these two groups of organizations differed significantly. We looked at R² 
and F-statistics between the 123 responses from government organisations (military, police and 
railway) and 64 responses from non-government organisations. We observed no significant 
difference in responses of these two groups as measured by R² and F-statistic. In the following 
section we explain our analysis of the model.  
4.1 Measurement Model 
To test the unidimensionality- the extent to which a set of indicators reflect a single underlying 
construct- was performed by satisfying two conditions (Gerbing and Anderson, 1998; Chen et al. 
2004; Hair et al. 2006). Firstly, an item must be empirically attached with the empirical indicators 
of a construct, and , second it must be attached with one and only construct. Here, in our study we 
have established the unidimensionality via assessing the overall fit of the CFA model. Following 
recommendations of the previous scholars, we have used multiple fit criteria to assess model fit ( 
Bentler, 1990; Bentler and Bonett, 1980; Hair et al. 2006). Based on several fit indices (χ²/df= 
1.43; goodness of fit [GFI]=0.94; adjusted goodness of fit [AGFI]=0.91; Bentler and Bonett’s 
normed fit index [NFI]= 0.97; Bentler and Bonett’s non-normed fit index [NNFI]= 0.96; Bentler 
comparative fit index [CFI]=0.99; root mean square residual [RMSR]= 0.04; root mean square 
error of approximation [RMSEA]=0.03), we can argue that the constructs used in our model 
possess unidimensionality. 
4.2 Convergent and Discriminant Validity Test 
We note that all the reliability coefficients are above 0.70, the standardized factor loading of each 
item is above 0.5 (Hair et al. 2006), the composite reliability is above 0.5 and each AVE is above 
0.5 (Hair et al. 2006) (see Table 3). This indicates that the measurements are consistent and the 
latent construct accounts for at least 50 percent of the variance in the items. Hence, it is evident 
that our measurement model demonstrates convergent validity. Table 4 shows that the square root 
of the AVE in the leading diagonal is greater than all the entries in the given row and column (i.e. 
above correlation coefficient values). The results in Table 4 further suggest that our model 
possesses discriminant validity. 
--- Insert Table 3 about here --- 
14 
 
--- Insert Table 4 about here --- 
 
4.3 Common Method Bias Test 
Podsakoff et al. (2003) argued that in the case of self-reported data, there is a possibility for 
common method bias. To test for common method bias we conducted the Harman one-factor test 
(as suggested by Podsakoff and Organ, 1986) on all five constructs of our model. Results presented 
in Table 5 indicate that the highest covariance explained by one factor is 30.73 percent meaning 
the impact of CMB in our study was not an issue. Next, following Guide and Ketokivi (2015) 
arguments, we have used a method variance (MV) marker to assess the CMB issue (Lindell and 
Whitney, 2001). We chose a three-item scale that measured information sharing which provided 
the lowest positive correlation as (r=0.011) between the MV marker and other variables, to adjust 
the construct correlations and statistical significance (Lindell and Whitney, 2001). None of the 
significant-correlations became non-significant after the adjustment, so we can argue that CMB 
was not a serious issue. 
--- Insert Table 5 about here --- 
4.3 Hypothesis Testing 
The hypothesized structural equation model (Figure 1) was tested using AMOS 24, with variance-
co-variance matrices for the latent variables and residual as input. The model fit indices 
(χ²/df=1.21; goodness of fit [GFI]=0.97; adjusted goodness of fit [AGFI]=0.92; Bentler and 
Bonett’s normed fit index [NFI]= 0.99; Bentler and Bonett’s non-normed fit index [NNFI]= 0.98; 
Bentler comparative fit index [CFI]=0.97; root mean square residual [RMSR]= 0.03; root mean 
square error of approximation [RMSEA]=0.04) suggests that the hypothesized model fits the data 
very well. 
Figure 2 represents the results of the five hypothesized relationships (H1-H5) among the study 
variables. We have found that all the hypothesized relationships were found to be significant at the 
level of 0.05. One of the major advantage of CBSEM is the ready accessibility to indirect and total 
effects, in addition to the direct causal effects between the exogenous and endogenous constructs. 
As we can see that all indirect effects were statistically significant at p<0.001 confidence level. 
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 ---- Insert Table 6 about here -----  
 
 
 
 
 β=0.49** 
 
 
 
 
 
** represent that the beta coefficient of the path shown in the Figure 2 was significant at 
p<0.001 level. 
 Figure 2: A final causal model  
 
5. Discussion 
Our interest in investigating the role of swift trust and commitment in improving coordination 
among actors in disaster relief is grounded commitment-trust theory. Furthermore, we extend the 
following research grounded in HRSC that highlight only fractions of our research model. First, 
Altay and Pal (2014) argue that efficient sharing of quality information among humanitarian actors 
facilitates coordination and hence an effective response. Second, Tatham and Kovacs (2010) argue 
that swift trust would improve coordination among actors of HRSCs.  
Our model attempts to integrate four independent constructs, information sharing, behavioral 
uncertainty reduction, swift trust and commitment to explain coordination among actors of 
HRSCs. We found a significant relationship between information sharing and swift trust (β=0.3, 
p<0.001)), clearly demonstrating that sharing information builds swift trust among humanitarian 
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actors. We also observed that information sharing has significant effect on behavioral uncertainty 
reduction (β=0.92, p<0.001). This findings of our further support Kwon and Suh (2004) findings 
in context to HRSCs. The link between behavioral uncertainty reduction and swift trust is 
significant (β=0.24, p<0.001). 
The link between swift trust and commitment is significant (β=0.49, p<0.001) (in line for example 
with the study of Kwon and Suh, 2004). By an additional post-hoc mediation test where we test 
the indirect effect of commitment on the relationship of trust and coordination we see that 
commitment plays a strong mediation role. This shows that commitment in HRSCs is a key 
mediator, but it seems to not automatically emerge as contested by CTT theory. Though being still 
applicable it seems that different context require different interpretations of CTT. In the context of 
swift trust CTT is therefore applicable, but less powerful due to the crisis context of the 
investigation. This observation supports our claim that swift trust has a strong influence on 
coordination while commitment may take some time to develop (Tatham and Kovacs, 2010). 
Finally, commitment among the actors in HRSCs have positive impact on coordination among 
actors (β=0.34, p<0.001). This result is found to be consistent with CTT. 
5.1 Theoretical Contributions 
The role of information sharing (Altay and Pal, 2014) and swift trust (Tatham and Kovacs, 2010) 
are well understood in the HRSCs literature. What is less understood is how information sharing 
and swift trust together interact with coordination. Three key aspects of this study signify our 
contribution to the HRSC literature. First, in this study we explain swift trust using information 
sharing and behavioral uncertainty. Our results extend the work of Tatham and Kovacs (2010) by 
establishing links between information sharing and swift trust and testing the relationships 
empirically. 
Second, we explore how swift trust can explain coordination in HRSCs and show that commitment 
plays a mediating role between swift trust and coordination. Prior studies on coordination in 
HRSCs identified barriers and enablers of coordination (Balcik et al., 2010; Akhtar et al., 2012; 
Kabra and Ramesh, 2015), yet theory focused explanations were not developed. Our attempt to 
explain coordination among humanitarian actors in HRSCs makes a significant contribution to this 
literature, particularly by also applying CTT to a new context. CTT plays also an important role in 
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the context of HRSCs, but interestingly it seems that the onus is more on the antecedents of swift 
trust to fuel coordination than the immediate link of swift trust and commitment. This might be 
due to the confounding effects of the context or the notion of swift trust which hasn’t been used in 
CTT. 
Third, we developed a framework for explaining coordination among humanitarian actors and 
tested it using data gathered from governmental and non-governmental organisations. We 
observed that despite significant differences in organizational culture, structure and size, our 
framework works the same way in both, governmental and non-governmental organisations to 
explain coordination in  HRSCs.  
5.2 Managerial Implications 
Our findings offer guidance to organizations involved in disaster relief activities. The study 
provides insight into building swift trust in rapidly formed temporary networks. Swift trust 
influences coordination in such networks but the mechanism that leads to coordination has not 
been explained before. Our study provides an avenue to understand how information sharing helps 
build trust quickly. Some managers may believe that trust is a prerequisite for sharing information 
with counterparties but our research indicates that the relationship between trust and information 
sharing is the other way around, i.e. information sharing builds trust. The findings of our study 
may also provide useful insights to managers in commercial supply chains who are in crisis 
management mode responding to major disruptions and need to work with people/organizations 
that they have not been involved before.  
6. Conclusion, Limitations and Further Research Directions 
In this study, drawing from CTT and swift trust literature we developed a theoretical framework 
on the mechanism of coordination and tested it using survey data. Our theoretical framework 
combines the contribution of two well established streams in literature, studies that explain the 
impact of information sharing on coordination in humanitarian relief supply chains and swift trust 
in hastily formed networks to improve coordination. We show that information sharing between 
organizations build swift trust. We also show that commitment plays a mediating role between 
swift trust and coordination in HRSCs. Our analyses based on 187 respondents from disaster 
response organizations in India largely support the hypothesized relationships in the theoretical 
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model. The study contributes to the humanitarian supply chain literature by building a theoretical 
framework for coordination in HRSCs and empirically testing it.  
While our study comes with clear managerial and theoretical implications, our results come with 
some limitations and future research directions. First, our study is confined to respondents from 
India only. This convenience sample does not allow us to generalize our findings. Therefore, we 
recommend that data gathered from a wider range of international humanitarian organizations be 
used to compare with our results. Second, our framework is based on information sharing and swift 
trust theories and does not consider learning where humanitarian actors can adapt to a given 
situation based on their previous experience and the experience of others. We have no doubt that 
learning should influence coordination in HRSCs over time. Consequently, we see the inclusion 
of learning as a potential factor in coordination as future work to ground our framework in terms 
of experience in disaster relief projects or other humanitarian work. Third, during our study we 
realized the difficulties in controlling cultural factors and organizational differences in structure 
that change over a period. Therefore, we think a longitudinal study with panel data would be very 
helpful in the identification and analysis of fixed and random effects. And lastly, forth, our study 
was motivated by a literature review which showed a need for theory building in HRSCs 
smanagement literature. We utilized surveys in our current research, but since disaster relief is 
multi-disciplinary work, a mixed-methods approach borrowing constructs and theories from other 
disciplines may provide better insights to explain coordination among humanitarian actors.    
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 Table 1. Construct Operationalization 
Construct Types Relevant 
Literature 
Survey items 
Information 
Sharing 
Reflective Zhou and Benton, 2007; 
Hsu et al., 2008; 
Yigitbasioglu, 2010 
1. Use of compatible information 
systems. 
2. Sharing of information related to 
various resources deployed for 
relief activities. 
3. Existence of a joint information 
center for effective sharing of 
information.  
 
Behavioral 
Uncertainty 
Reduction 
Reflective Weed and Mitchell, 1980 
Kwon and Suh, 2004 
1. There is clarity of roles. 
2. Getting along with my work group. 
3. Organize my work. 
4. Seeking help when necessary. 
 
Swift Trust Reflective Tatham and Kovacs, 2010; 
Robert et al., 2009;Hung et al., 
2004 
1. I find my colleagues trustworthy. 
2. Most people tell the truth about their 
knowledge. 
3. Clear rules for classification of 
processes and procedures. 
4. Trust based on third party reference. 
 
Commitment Reflective Morgan and Hunt, 1994; 
Kwon and Suh, 2004, 2005; 
Wu et al., 2004; 
Jin et al., 2013 
 
1. Impact of relationship termination 
on the goal of disaster response. 
2. Observed improvement in 
coordination. 
3. Organizations share values. 
 
Coordination Reflective Balcik et al., 2010 
Akhtar et al., 2012 
Basnet, 2013 
1. We consult other members before 
making decisions. 
2. We understand the pressures and 
concerns of each other. 
3. We synchronize our activities with 
each other. 
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Table 2. Profiles of the respondents 
Organizations Title 
Number of 
respondents 
Percent 
Military 
Brigadier 34 18.18 
Colonel  18 9.63 
Lieutenant Colonel 23 12.30 
Major 3 1.60 
Captain 1 0.53 
Lieutenant 3 1.60 
State Police 
Department 
Director General of Police or 
Commissioner of Police 
4 2.14 
Additional Commissioner of Police or 
Inspector General of Police 
2 1.07 
Joint Commissioner of Police or Deputy 
Inspector General of Police 
2 1.07 
Deputy Commissioner of Police or Senior 
Superintendent of Police  
3 1.60 
Additional Deputy Commissioner of 
Police or Additional Superintendent of 
Police 
4 2.14 
Assistant Commissioner of Police or 
Deputy Superintendent of Police 
15 8.02 
Indian Railway 
Disaster 
Response Team 
    
General Manager 1 0.53 
Additional General Manager 1 0.53 
Divisional Railway Manager 5 2.67 
Additional Divisional Railway Manager 4 2.14 
NGOs 
Vice President 16 8.56 
General Manager 7 3.74 
Senior Manager 7 3.74 
Manager 12 6.42 
Deputy Manager 12 6.42 
Assistant Manager 10 5.35 
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Table 3. Loadings of the Indicator Variables and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) 
Construct Indicator 
Factor 
Loading 
Varianc
e 
Error SCR AVE 
Information 
Sharing (IS) 
IS1 0.85 0.72 0.28 0.87 0.70 
IS2 0.84 0.71 0.29   
IS3 
 
0.81 0.66 0.34   
Behavioral 
Certainty 
(BC) 
BU1 0.99 0.99 0.01 0.97 0.90 
BU2 0.98 0.96 0.04   
BU3 0.92 0.85 0.15   
BU4 
 
0.90 0.81 0.19   
Swift Trust 
(ST) 
ST1 0.97 0.94 0.06 0.98 0.91 
ST2 0.96 0.93 0.07   
ST3 0.96 0.93 0.07   
ST4 0.94 0.88 0.12   
ST5 
 
0.93 0.87 0.13   
Commitment 
(C) 
C1 0.97 0.95 0.05 0.97 0.92 
C2 0.93 0.86 0.14   
C3 
 
0.97 0.94 0.06   
Coordination 
(CO) 
CO1  0.71 0.50 0.50 0.81 0.59 
CO2 0.73 0.54 0.46   
CO3 0.86 0.74 0.26   
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Table 4. Correlation Table 
 
IS BU ST C CO 
      
IS 0.84* 
    
BU 0.35 0.95* 
   
ST 0.24 0.39 0.95* 
  
C 0.07 0.21 0.18 0.96* 
 
CO 0.23 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.77* 
 
*  represent square root of AVE 
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Table 5. Total Variance Explained 
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
t 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
T
o
tal 
%
 o
f 
V
arian
c
e 
C
u
m
u
la
tiv
e %
 
T
o
tal 
%
 o
f 
V
arian
c
e 
C
u
m
u
la
tiv
e %
 
T
o
tal 
%
 o
f 
V
arian
c
e 
C
u
m
u
la
tiv
e %
 
1 4.527 25.148 25.148 4.527 25.148 25.148 3.353 18.627 18.627 
2 3.359 18.660 43.809 3.359 18.660 43.809 2.982 16.568 35.195 
3 1.949 10.830 54.639 1.949 10.830 54.639 2.924 16.244 51.439 
4 1.756 9.755 64.394 1.756 9.755 64.394 2.055 11.417 62.856 
5 1.359 7.551 71.944 1.359 7.551 71.944 1.636 9.089 71.944 
6 1.063 5.907 77.852       
7 .737 4.092 81.944       
8 .675 3.749 85.693       
9 .579 3.215 88.908       
10 .472 2.622 91.531       
11 .385 2.141 93.672       
12 .273 1.518 95.190       
13 .235 1.305 96.494       
14 .203 1.130 97.624       
15 .187 1.037 98.661       
16 .132 .731 99.392       
17 .109 .608 100.000       
18 
-1.318E-
017 
-7.324E-
017 
100.000 
      
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Table 6. Summary of Hypotheses Testing 
Path Direct Effect Indirect 
Effect 
Total Effect P Supported/Not 
supported 
H1: IS→ST 0.3 (0.080) 0.38 p<0.001 Supported 
H2: IS→ BC 0.92 --------- --------- p<0.001 Supported 
H3: BC→ST 0.24 --------- --------- p<0.001 Supported 
H4: ST→C 0.49 --------- --------- p<0.001 Supported 
H5: C→CO 0.34 --------- --------- p<0.001 Supported 
 
